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Purpose – The paper examines the operation of the Land (compulsory sale for redevelopment) 
Ordinance, one of a series of urban renewal policy initiatives introduced by the Hong Kong 
Government. The new institutional arrangement was mooted as a means to facilitate greater 
private sector participation in the renewal process by overcoming existing constraints on land 
assembly, which arise as the result of a system of common property ownership. The paper 
investigates whether the legislation can achieve the objective of encouraging private sector 
participation in the urban renewal process. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper adopts a transaction cost framework, drawn from 
literature and applied in the context of real estate, to examine the effects of a new Ordinance. In 
addition to publicly available data, semi-structured interviews were conducted with professionals 
involved in urban renewal and representatives  from  the  property  development  companies. The 
apparently low usage of the new approach is explored in the context of the various alternative 
mechanisms for land assembly available to the private sector and the effects of transactions costs 
on developer behaviour. 
 
Findings – The paper identifies that the relatively low usage of the Ordinance may be explained 
by institutional constraints and limitations in the legislation, which, in its current form, fails to 
provide sufficient incentives, but that developer behaviour may also be affected by other external 
factors. 
 
Research limitations/implications – The research is limited in that any commentary on the 
effectiveness of the legislation in achieving its objectives is restricted by the inability to clearly 
identify those incidences where the threat of legal action was sufficient to achieve a negotiated 
acquisition of the necessary property rights. Further research might explore the implications and 
the inter-relationships between the various urban renewal initiatives introduced by the Hong Kong 
Government. 
 
Practical implications – The recent experience of the Hong Kong Government in designing a 
new institutional mechanism to overcome problems of private sector land assembly for properties 
in multiple-ownership may offer more general lessons for those in similar environments who wish 
to use the resources of the private sector to contribute to the urban renewal process. 
 
Originality/value – The paper adopts a transaction cost approach to examine the working of a 
new policy initiative for facilitating land assembly in Hong Kong and may be of interest to 
academics and practitioners involved in the area of urban renewal. 
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A number of authors (Fong, 1985; Yeh, 1990; Lai, 1993; Adams and Hastings, 2000, 2001) have 
examined the urban renewal process in Hong Kong. In each case the authors identified the 
problem of land assembly as an underlying constraint of the success to redevelopment projects. 
 
In Hong Kong, the major public agency involved in the urban process is the Urban 
Redevelopment Authority (URA), a statutory body, established in 2001 to replace the Land 
Development Corporation which, constrained by institutional arrangements, was seen as 
ineffective (Adams and Hastings, 2001). But in addition to the public agencies, the Government 
has always encouraged private sector involvement in the renewal process. However, by the 1990s 
there was an increasing awareness that the difficulties of assembling sufficiently large sites for 
redevelopment projects in the urban areas was making urban renewal a much less attractive option 
for the private sector developers. 
 
The Government, recognising the need for a rethink, embarked on a complete review of 
institutional arrangements and policies and in 1999, as part of the wider changes to the institutional 
environment, introduced the Land (compulsory sale for redevelopment) Ordinance Cap545 which, 
it was believed, would facilitate land assembly by the private sector and thereby encourage greater 
interest in the area of urban renewal. 
 
This paper investigates whether the new institutional arrangement can meet the objectives of 
encouraging private sector participation in the urban renewal process. The paper adopts an 
institutional framework, drawn from literature and applied in the context of real estate, to examine 
the effects of existing property rights structures on the land assembly process and the implications 
of the new institutional arrangement. The apparent low usage of the new mechanism is explored 
in the context of the various alternative mechanisms for land assembly available to the private 
sector and the effects of transaction costs on developer behaviour. The paper considers whether, 
in light of the findings, the new institutional arrangement provides sufficient incentive to 
encourage the desired private sector involvement in the renewal process. In addition to the publicly 
available data, semi-structured interviews were conducted with professionals involved in real estate 
and urban renewal and representatives from the property development companies. 
 
2. INSTITUTIONS, TRANSACTION COSTS AND REAL ESTATE 
 
Assembling the necessary site for redevelopment is dependent upon the ability of the developer 
to acquire and control all the property rights and therefore, development proposals may be 
constrained by the actions and behaviour of owners (Adams, 1996). Ownership or property rights 
are the rights of the individual in relation to ownership, use and exchange of an asset. The nature 
of the right, whether private or held in common with others, affects owner choices in the control 
of the asset. The nature of the property right and the degree of control is therefore, an important 
consideration in a transaction, particularly given the opportunity to put the asset to a more valuable 
use (Eggertsson, 1995). Property rights do not necessarily remain constant, but may be changed as 
economic conditions change (Barzel, 1997). 
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The concept of examining the costs incurred in a transaction of property rights originated with 
Coase (1937) followed by the other authors (Williamson, 1985; North, 1990; De Alessi, 1991; 
Furubotn and Richter, 1991; Barzel, 1997). In his analysis of transactions, Williamson (1985) 
identified five elements of a transaction, which he defined as the characteristics of uncertainty, 
frequency and asset specificity and the behavioural assumptions of bounded rationality and 
opportunism, all of which create friction and affect the cost of a transaction. 
 
The costs in relation to a specific transaction will be determined by the particular circumstances 
and institutional arrangements and are often categorised into those relating to search and 
information, negotiation and decision-making and supervision and enforcement. But as Hong 
(1998) notes, Williamson (1985, pp. 390-1) recognised that, in practice, transaction costs are not 
always measurable. 
 
Institutions or ‘the rules of the game’ (North, 1990) are transaction governance systems or 
arrangements, designed to reduce the imperfections  and uncertainties which increase the cost of 
interaction in the market. The study of institutions is important since, as Seabrooke et al. (2004) 
argue, they create a “public ordering context within which private ordering decisions occur”. 
Although North (1990) suggests institutions are devised to reduce uncertainty and provide 
structure for society, there may be no rationale for the prevailing institutional structure (Ball, 1998). 
A review of the literature provides a number of explanations as to why inefficient institutional 
arrangements may exist, including the complexity of relationships and the high costs of effecting 
institutional change (North, 1990), the reflection of influence and power within society (Keogh 
and D’Arcy, 1998; Foss, 1995). But institutions change, as groups identify that existing institutions 
ignore benefits which could be secured by different arrangements and lobby Governments to alter 
the framework (Feeny, 1988). Hence the choice of institution is determined by the desire to 
minimise transaction costs. 
 
Real estate markets are generally regarded as both institutionalised and inefficient. They are highly 
complex entities but weak transparency, substitutability and adaptive elasticity are all sources of 
uncertainty resulting in high transaction costs. In this case, using Williamson’s (1985) approach of 
transaction characteristics and behavioural assumptions, an examination of the transaction costs 
of land assembly allows for a later assessment of the effects of the new legislation 
 
In terms of land assembly, all Williamson’s transaction characteristics will have a substantial effect 
on the cost of transaction. Uncertainty is important since it occurs as a result of an individual’s 
limitations in knowledge and information in relation to both the asset and the preferences and 
information of the other party. The higher the element of uncertainty, the higher the  transaction  
costs  that  will  be  incurred. The introduction of new institutional arrangements will, at least 
initially, increase the uncertainty of the operating environment and, until ‘operationally’ tried and 
tested, may add rather than reduce uncertainty to the process. Frequency may also be an issue in 
terms of land assembly, since the circumstances of each transaction will be different, and if large 
scale or high value may also be relatively infrequent. Acquisition of land in site assembly 
transactions is also highly asset-specific and, given the high value and competitive nature of real 
estate development, Williamson’s behavioural assumptions of bounded rationality and 
opportunism will be demonstrated in the land assembly process. 
 
Transaction costs in the land acquisition or assembly process involve searching and analysing 
information as to site availability, ownership and property rights and the institutional 
arrangements, since if the latter are well defined and understood, transaction costs will be lowered 
but, if either is poorly defined or in the process of being changed, then there is greater uncertainty. 
Depending upon the nature of the property rights, negotiating an agreement between the parties 
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may be a relatively speedy and straightforward process, but, in the case of assets held in common, 
the likelihood of hold-ups increases since each individual has to accept the proposal and, as Olson 
(1965) notes, individuals in larger groups may group together only when it is in their personal, 
rather than collective, interest to do so. The enforcement of exchange normally falls within the 
rule of law, but existing institutional arrangements have resulted in an expensive system of 
adjudication. All these factors affect the cost of any transaction of land assembly, making 
redevelopment in these circumstances a more costly and less attractive option 
 
3. HONG KONG: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND LAND 
ASSEMBLY 
 
In Hong Kong the Government holds the freehold interest in land, assigning property rights to 
individuals through a system of leasehold interests. For properties in multiple ownership, these 
rights are structured as a co-ownership system of tenants-in-common, whereby each co-owner 
holds undivided shares in the whole. (Kent et al., 2002). 
 
The adoption of a tenants-in-common property rights system has had far reaching implications 
for the process of assembling land held in multiple ownership. In order for redevelopment to take 
place, it is necessary to acquire all the interests in a property, but for the private sector this is 
entirely dependent on negotiating agreement and any individual owner can prevent the process by 
refusing to vote their block of shares. In these circumstances, private developers often face 
extended negotiations and unrealistic highly expectations as to values, resulting in delays in the 
land assembly process. 
 
In order to address the difficulties of acquiring properties held in multiple ownership, the 
Government introduced the Land (compulsory sale for redevelopment) Ordinance Cap545. The 
Ordinance is designed to make the process of land assembly for redevelopment easier by allowing 
“the majority owner” of the undivided shares in a lot to make an application to the Lands Tribunal 
for an order of sale of all the undivided shares. Providing the Lands Tribunal is satisfied that the 
conditions specified in the Ordinance have been met then the property can be publicly auctioned 
and the proceeds divided between the owners. 
 
Although the public acquisition of private property rights for the subsequent disposal to private 
developers has precedent in a number of jurisdictions (Adams, 1996; Ulen, 1992) as can be seen 
from the restrictions placed on the Land Development Corporation (Adams and Hastings, 2001), 
the use of Government resumption powers for non-public purposes is a politically sensitive issue 
in Hong Kong. But, as Cruden (1999) notes, the introduction of a specific institutional 
arrangement to allow the private compulsory acquisitions of private property rights raises an even 
greater number of issues. It is not however, the intention of this paper to address the legitimacy 
of the infringement on private property rights, but rather to examine the transaction cost 
implications of the new arrangements on developers’ choice and behaviour in the land assembly 
process. 
 
Although there is no available information as to how many parties have successfully agreed a 
negotiated settlement on the grounds that the legislation would apply, it is possible to investigate 
the number of applications to the Lands Tribunal as an indicative measure of the extent of interest 
in using the legislation. 
 
An analysis of the Lands Tribunal records indicates that four applications were submitted 
immediately the legislation became operative in 1999 and, by the end of 2003, a total of eight 
applications had been submitted. As a matter of public record, the Tribunal has granted an order 
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for sale in two cases and the representatives of the developers confirm a further three reached 
negotiated settlement before the completion of the hearing. The remainder are currently in 
abeyance. On the basis of this information it appears that, despite the acknowledged difficulties of 
acquiring properties in multiple ownership, few developers have chosen to institute proceedings 
under the new Ordinance. 
 
4. LAND ASSEMBLY: A TRANSACTION COST FRAMEWORK 
 
The Government’s intention in changing the institutional arrangements in relation to the control 
of property rights was to provide an additional incentive for the private developers by reducing 
uncertainty in the land assembly process. However, it should not be assumed that land assembly 
through the acquisition of properties held in multiple ownership is the only strategic option for 
property developers seeking to acquire development sites. 
 
The paper therefore looks at the other major options available to the private sector property 
developers for acquiring land for development purposes in Hong Kong. Adopting the arguments 
in Hong (1998), a modified transaction cost framework can be devised to examine the relationship 
between the private developers’ strategic options for land assembly and the extent to which the 
level of transaction costs incurred in each of the options will affect the behaviour of the developer. 
Accepting that each organisation’s knowledge and information may be different and assuming 
Williamson’s transaction characteristics and behavioural assumptions are exogenous variables of a 
transaction then, in overall terms, the level of the transaction cost between the different options 
will depend upon the transparency of the information, the numbers of parties involved in the 
negotiation and the available enforcement mechanisms. 
 
Adopting a deductive approach, it is therefore possible to devise a modified transaction cost 
framework, which identifies the likely level of transaction cost that will be incurred in each of the 
above categories, for each of the principle options available to a developer wishing to assemble 
land in Hong Kong. 
 
As indicated in Table I, it may be deducted that the highest levels of transaction costs will be found 
in private negotiations with individual co-owners. Such transactions are likely to involve extensive  
information searching and prolonged negotiations with large number of parties, which may, in 
turn, increase the need for increased supervision and enforcement. 
 
Principal options for land assembly in Hong Kong 
 























High Low Low Medium Low 
Negotiation & 
decision making 
High Low Medium High Low 
Supervision & 
enforcement 
High Low Low Medium Low 
Source: Compiled by the authors 
 
Table 1: Modified transaction costs framework for land assembly in Hong Kong 
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As an alternative to the direct acquisition of individual sites, developers may attempt to acquire 
companies which own substantial real estate assets as part of corporate resources. In this case, 
although the initial acquisition of the company will involve information search and negotiation 
costs, the level of transaction costs may be lower than those associated with the assembly of 
multiple ownerships and, if successful, the developers will acquire a portfolio of redevelopable 
assets. 
 
Where the level of information search and negotiation costs are high, other alternatives such as 
acquiring land offered under the Government’s land sales programme (see Table II) will become 
more attractive. In this case, the clearly defined property rights and exchange process will lower 
the search information costs, and the increased transparency of the auction or tender arrangements 
will reduce the requirement for extensive negotiation with numerous parties. It is likely that 
monitoring and enforcement costs will be lower than those incurred in private transactions as the 
Government is unlikely to withdraw from the transaction. 
 
Land sales and tenders 
  Hong Kong Island Kowloon New Territories 
Date Number Area (m2) Number Area (m2) Number Area (m2) 
2001-2002 – – 4 39,473.00 10 46,222.00 
2002-2003 3 5,795.80 3 27,455.00 2 20,658.80 
2003-2004 3 5,034.00 3 14,737.70 4 7,464.20 
Source: Lands Department, Hong Kong Government 
 
Table II: Government land sales: 2001-2004 
 
 
Although negotiations with a joint venture partner will create higher levels of transaction costs 
than acquiring land at a Government auction, joint venture transactions with a statutory body will 
have similar advantages of greater transparency over private negotiations. Table III shows the 
number of joint venture projects offered by the URA. 
 
 










2,030 Residential/commercial 7 Sino Land 
Co. 




7,782 Residential/commercial 14 Sino Land 
Co. 
10.06.04 HK Island 2,120 Residential/commercial 14 K. Wah 
Holdings 
Source: Compiled from Urban Renewal Authority press releases (various) 
 




Given the high asset specificity of real estate, some developers may prefer to operate within a 
hierarchical governance structure, which allows for a great degree of control and lower transaction 
costs. Many developers in Hong Kong hold extensive real estate portfolios or land banks (see 
Table IV) and at certain times may choose to carry out development activities by utilising their 
existing portfolio assets in preference to acquiring land in the market. 
 
 
Land bank of property companies’ portfolio holdings in Hong Kong (million feet2) 
Developer 2001 2002 2003 
Sun Hung Kai 54.1 50.4 45.3 
Henderson 21.3 20.9 19.0 
New World 17.0 20.0 18.7 
Cheung Kong 21.8 21.9 18.6 
Sino 12.3 16.1 15.8 
Swire Pacific 14.7 14.7 15.3 
Hang Lung 9.2 9.1 10.0 
Hongkong Land 5.3 5.3 5.1 
Notes: Compiled as square feet attributable gross floor area 
Source: Companies annual reports 
 
Table IV: Hong Kong Developers: portfolio holdings 
 
 
As is indicated in Table I, in the absence of any specific institutional arrangements facilitating land 
assembly, the highest level of transaction costs for a private sector developer will be incurred in 
negotiation with individual owners. Given the new institutional arrangements are specifically 
designed to address this situation, it might be anticipated that the developers would choose to 
invoke the legislation in order to reduce the transaction costs associated with this form of land 
assembly. 
 
One explanation for the lack of interest  may  be institutional  uncertainty The introduction of new 
institutional arrangements will not immediately guarantee a more certain environment and until 
such time as it becomes clearer as to how the Court will interpret and enforce the new legislation, 
there may be a degree of operational inertia. Hence the relatively low usage of the new arrangement 
may be the outcome of developers’ uncertainty as to the level of transaction costs which will be 
incurred. Therefore, although the legislation has been successfully implemented in two cases, the 
period of time since the introduction of the legislation may simply be too short for developers to 
feel comfortable with the new arrangements. 
 
It should not be assumed that the introduction of new institutional arrangements will automatically 
generate more interest in urban renewal projects. Over time different developers will have gained 
experience and developed their own areas of expertise. Since operating in a familiar environment 
increases the frequency of operation and reduces transaction costs, the introduction of a new 
institutional mechanism may be of little interest to developers who do not chose to assemble land 
in this way. 
 
Although the introduction of majority ownership thresholds will lower the transaction costs, it 
may also be argued that the requirements of the legislation are such that the reduction in 
transaction costs is too small to provide sufficient inducement for developers to choose this 
method of land assembly over other alternatives. The requirement for acquisition of at least 90 per 
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cent of the interests and proof of attempts to acquire the remainder on fair and reasonable terms 
will still involve protracted negotiations. The legislation does however, contain a provision for the 
chief executive to reduce the threshold to 80 per cent, but to date this option has not been 
exercised. 
 
Comparisons can be made with Singapore, where in 1999 the Singaporean Government adopted 
a similar approach to the difficulties of assembling land in multiple ownership and amended the 
Strata Title Act to allow collective sales of strata title property where (for properties over ten years 
old) a minimum threshold of 80 per cent of the owners wished to sell their interest (Christudason, 
2003). Richard (2003) notes that the amendment has increased interest in collective sales for 
redevelopment, resulting in eight sales in 2003. 
 
The way in which the legislation is enacted may also create a situation in which a developer is 
unable to utilise the mechanism to assemble a project site. The Ordinance requires the acquisition 
of 90 per cent of the interests in a “lot”. But in practice, if a lot contains four interests then it is 
technically impossible to acquire 90 per cent of the interests and so the Ordinance will not apply. 
The problem may be compounded in the case of larger scale redevelopment projects which may 
cover several lots, demonstrated by a proposed redevelopment project for which the site has been 
assembled piecemeal over a period of some 20 years. The total site area is 118,800 sq. ft (11,037 
m2) of which the developer has acquired 73,000 sq. ft (6,782 m2) by negotiation and agreed a 
further land exchange of 45,000 sq. ft (4,180 m2) with the Government, but is unable to reach 
agreement with the owners of two remaining units (totalling 800 sq. ft/74 m2) and unable to 
invoke the legislation (The Standard, 2003) 
 
 











86 1999 February 2003 
Fuk Wing Street/Fuk 
Wa Street Kowloon 
84 1999 February 2003 
Johnston Road, 
Hong Kong 
92 1999 December 2003 
Po On Road/Shun 
Ning Road, Kowloon 
89 1999 June 2003 
Reclamation Street, 
Kowloon 
80 1999 June 2003 
Source: Urban Renewal Authority Annual Report 2002-2003 
 
Table V: Urban Renewal Authority Projects (2003) 
 
It is also important to appreciate that the Land (compulsory sale for redevelopment) Ordinance is 
not the only recent change in institutional arrangements affecting urban renewal. In creating the 
Urban Renewal Authority, the Government has introduced an alternative and more 
comprehensive supply-side mechanism which may be a more realistic instrument to implement 
the objectives of urban renewal outlined in the Urban Renewal Strategy (2001). Although the 
Urban Renewal Authority chooses to negotiate with affected parties, the power to implement 
resumption procedures without the requirement of meeting a 90 per cent ownership threshold 
ensures that land assembly is less of an issue (see Table V). The framework set out in Government’s 
strategy document, requires the authority to produce a series of five-year Corporate Plans 
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identifying projects that will start during the period. This arrangement is likely to deter any private 
sector interest in assembling sites in an “identified” area since there is no guarantee that the 
authority will  later agree to any joint venture partnership arrangements. 
 
Although developers have not chosen to make extensive use of the new mechanism, Ball (1998) 
argues that  it  cannot  be  assumed  that  any  private  sector  activity (or inactivity) is directly 
related to the new arrangements since development activity may be more the result of external 
changes in the economy than the introduction of new institutional strategies. This view may well 
be applicable in the present case, where developers’ current lack of interest in utilising the new 
arrangements may have more to do with the carrying of up-front costs in a deflationary as opposed 




By applying a transaction costs approach, the paper identifies that the acquisition of land by 
negotiation from individual owners in properties held in multiple ownership results in higher levels 
of transaction costs than the alternative methods of land assembly for private sector developers. 
 
However, an examination of the available records provides little indication that private sector 
developers have chosen to take advantages of the new institutional arrangement. Further 
investigation indicates that the limited usage of the Land (compulsory sale for redevelopment) 
Ordinance may have a number of underlying causes, all of which will affect the transaction costs 
of the operating environment and hence the developers’ behaviour. 
 
First, the design and structure of any new institutional arrangement must, in reality, involve 
compromise. An obvious difficulty for any government in devising new institutional arrangements 
is to achieve the desired objectives whilst balancing the claims of individual property rights and 
wider public interest. As Ball (1998) suggests “Potential for institutional change must reflect what 
is feasible rather than what is ideally desirable and changing institutional arrangements in the law 
might have the potential to enhance market efficiency but be unfeasible from the viewpoint of 
social attitudes to property rights”. The new Ordinance falls clearly into this category. The 
Government is well aware of the difficulties created by the common ownership property rights 
structure since this not only affects redevelopment but also another area currently undergoing 
policy review, the management of such properties. The issue of whether the new Ordinance would 
contravene the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s constitution, was also discussed during the debates in the 
Provisional Legislative Council. 
 
As the paper identifies, in its current form, the legislation has inherent defects as an institutional 
mechanism. The threshold is set at a level which is difficult, and in certain situations, impossible, 
to achieve. The experience of the Urban Renewal Authority appears to indicate that even the offer 
of generous ex gratia payments is insufficient to achieve negotiated acceptances and resumption 
powers are invoked before the 90 per cent threshold level. In practice, although the majority 
ownership provision will assist in certain cases, at this threshold level it appears not to provide 
sufficient incentives to make it of interest to the developers. The legislation is also designed to 
apply only to the acquisition of an individual lot but acquisition on a lot by lot basis may be of 
limited benefit to developers in assembling a site. This has resulted in further lobbying for more 
direct incentives. 
 
The research also identifies that limited utilisation may have little to do with the design of 
institution mechanism per se, but is rather the result of more general factors such as institutional 
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uncertainty, developers preferences for operating in more familiar arenas or the economic climate 
in Hong Kong at the present time. 
 
Finally, the research indicates that the Ordinance is not a panacea for the difficulties experienced 
by the private sector in land assembly process. In the long run it appears likely that with a much 
wider remit and powers, the newly created Urban Renewal Authority will dominate redevelopment 
activities in the urban areas. In these circumstances assembling multiple ownership sites will 
become increasingly less attractive, private sector participation will take the form of joint venture 
arrangements as an easier and cheaper option and the Ordinance is unlikely to be anything more 
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